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Abstract 
This contribution discusses legal methodology problems of multilevel trade and investment regulation 
(section I) and explores related problems of adjudication involving investment projects in the context of 
China’s 2013 ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) initiative involving more than 65 countries (section II). 
The very limited number of investor-state arbitration proceedings initiated so far by foreign companies 
against China - or by Chinese companies against foreign host states – suggests that alternative dispute 
resolution may become one of the important ‘legal innovations’ of China’s OBOR cooperation. Yet, 
also involvement of third parties as ‘mediators’ or ‘conciliators’ in dispute settlement proceedings raises 
questions of ‘justice’ and of legal methodology that are easier to resolve by embedding OBOR 
regulations into multilateral trade, investment and UN law 
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  1 
Introduction* 
The 2013 ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) initiative by the Chinese President Xi Jinping envisages 
investing more than $1 trillion for the construction and infrastructure of a ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ 
(following the ancient silk road from China through central Asia and the Middle East to Europe) and for 
a ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ (linking China to Southeast Asia and East Africa) so as to promote 
international policy coordination, infrastructure facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial 
integration as well as human ‘people-to-people bonds’ among more than 65 countries bordering these 
‘Silk Roads’.  The realization of this ambitious financial, investment, trade and policy cooperation will 
depend, inter alia, on multilevel private and public, national and international legal regulation. Even 
though the design of OBOR cooperation seems to evolve pragmatically , its legal coherence and 
legitimacy will require mutually consistent rule-of-law and dispute settlement mechanisms, as illustrated 
by the establishment of a Chinese-European Arbitration Center at Hamburg (Germany) and of China-
Africa Joint Arbitration Centers at Johannesburg (South Africa) and Shanghai (China). The limited 
number of investor-state arbitration proceedings initiated so far by foreign companies against China - or 
by Chinese companies against foreign host states  - seems to confirm the Chinese preferences for 
alternative dispute settlement methods that avoid recourse to international or domestic courts (e.g. also 
in view of the often inadequate independence and judicial expertise of local courts in some African and 
Asian countries). Promotion of such alternative dispute resolution may become one of the important 
‘legal innovations’ of China’s OBOR cooperation. Yet, also involvement of third parties as ‘mediators’ 
or ‘conciliators’ in dispute settlement proceedings raises questions of ‘justice’ and of legal methodology. 
How to promote legitimacy of OBOR regulations? Lessons from the past    
Since ancient times, legal rules and institutions (like markets) have proven to be indispensable 
instruments for international trade (lex mercatoria) and for the peaceful governance of peoples. Chinese 
civilization is older – and was for many centuries more developed (e.g. in terms of inventions like 
printing, paper-making, the compass, gun-powder, locks for canals) – than European civilization. Yet, 
the ‘political invention’ of constitutionalism - as a legal limitation on feudal powers (like the decision 
of the Ming emperor in China in 1480 to forbid overseas trade and exploration) and as the legal 
foundation of liberty and welfare of citizens - emerged in Europe about 500 BC in response to the rivalry 
among city republics around the Mediterranean, i.e. millennia before China adopted its first Constitution 
of 1911. Democratic and republican constitutionalism holds that - in order to limit abuses of power, 
enhance the input- and output legitimacy of law and governance, be socially accepted as legitimate and 
voluntarily complied with, and progressively institutionalize ‘public reason’ - all three basic functions 
of law need to be justified both among citizens as ultimate sources of legal legitimacy and ‘constituent 
powers’, as well as vis-à-vis citizens as ‘democratic principals’ of governments, to which citizens 
delegate only limited ‘constituted powers’: 
                                                     
* Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann is Emeritus professor of International and European Law and former head of the Law 
Department at the European University Institute Florence (EUI), Italy; visiting professor at Xi’an Jiaotong 
University, China. Former legal advisor in the German Ministry of Economic Affairs, GATT and the WTO; 
former secretary, member or chairman of numerous GATT and WTO dispute settlement panels. Former 
rapporteur (1993-1999) and chairman (2000-2014) of the International Trade Law Committee of the 
International Law Association. The author wishes to thank Prof. W.Zhou from UNSW Law School at Sydney 
(Australia) for constructive criticism of an earlier draft. The contribution is based on my lecture at the 10 th 
Anniversary International Symposium on ‘China and the Development of International Dispute Resolution 
System in the Context of the “Belt and Road Initiative”’. Accepted for publication in the conference book 
published by Cambridge University Press (2018).  
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• the instrumental function of law for the normative ordering of social cooperation (e.g. the need for 
protecting equal individual rights for welfare-increasing cooperation among free and reasonable 
citizens);  
• the systemic function of law for justifying the reasonable coherence of legal ‘primary rules of 
conduct’ and ‘secondary rules’ of recognition, change and adjudication (e.g. the need for 
promoting the consistency of utilitarian trade and investment rules with the human rights, rule of 
law and democracy principles that have become recognized by all UN member states as integral 
parts of UN law); and  
• the cultural function of law for transforming the ‘law in the books’ into social facts (‘living law’) 
through ‘legal socialization’ and ‘institutionalization of public reason’ inducing legal subjects to 
voluntarily comply with legal rules and principles (e.g. the obligation of each WTO member under 
Article XVI:4 WTO Agreement to ‘ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and 
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements’). 
Diversity of Chinese and Western legal traditions and constitutionalism 
The bestselling book by Peter Frankopan on ‘The Silk Roads. A New History of the World’ begins with 
the childhood recollection of the author that the ‘accepted and lazy history of civilization … is one where 
Ancient Greece begat Rome, Rome begat Christian Europe, Christian Europe begat the Renaissance, 
the Renaissance the Enlightenment, the Enlightenment political democracy and the industrial revolution. 
Industry crossed with democracy in turn yielded the United States, embodying the rights to life, liberty 
and the pursuit of happiness.’1 His book documents how this biased, Western vision of history based on 
a ‘mantra of the political, cultural and moral triumph of the West’ ignores many older civilizations 
(notably in Asia) and the dark sides of European civilization (like imperial ‘opium wars’ in Asia, 
genocide in Europe). Yet, the postwar elaboration of international monetary, trade and investment law 
continues to be mainly shaped by European and North-American countries and by their bilateral and 
multilateral trade and investment agreements. Will the comparatively fewer Asian initiatives for new 
regional and multilateral trade and investment rules and organizations - like the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), the China-led OBOR project and the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank – lead to substantive changes in international economic law (IEL)? 
Until World War II, Asian traditions of justifying law and governance vis-à-vis citizens fundamentally 
differed from those in European and North-American constitutional democracies. For instance, while 
democratic, republican and cosmopolitan constitutionalism were discussed in Europe and legally 
evolved since the ancient Athenian democracy and Roman republic 2500 year ago, republican 
constitutionalism emerged in China only since 1911. Since Plato’s book on The Republic (ca 375 BC), 
the metaphor of the ‘state ship’ is used in Western republicanism for describing the legal structure that 
protects society from the dangerous waters surrounding it. The Chinese proverb attributed to the 
Confucian philosopher Xunzi (298-220 BC) used the same metaphor of the ‘state ship’ in a significantly 
different way: ‘The heavens create the people and appoint the ruler. The ruler is like a boat, the people 
are like the water. The water may support the boat, and it may also capsize it.’ In the Western metaphor, 
society and its rulers are on the boat together; the captain acts as an agent of the people who are the 
democratic principal and ‘constituent power’. The Chinese metaphor described the people as keeping 
the state afloat without being on board the ship and without being capable of reforming or steering it. 
Such ‘pre-conceptions’ of law, the state and of citizens are bound to influence legal interpretations. For 
instance, the 1982 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China is based on the democratic principle 
that ‘all power belongs to the people’ (Article 2). Democratic constitutions derive from this principle 
the need for protecting human rights and delegation of limited powers to democratically elected 
                                                     
1  P. Frankopan, The Silk Roads. A New History of the World, London : Bloomsbury, 2015, at xiii.  
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legislative, executive and judicial government branches so as to protect constitutional, participatory, 
representative and deliberative self-government of, by and for citizens and peoples. China’s 
Constitution, however, emphasizes the need for ‘dictatorship by the proletariat’ (Preamble) and the 
‘people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class’ (Article 1), as postulated by Karl Marx based 
on his claims to know ‘historic truth’ about the domination of the human condition by materialism. 
Authoritarian claims to know ‘truth’ seem to be related also to the neglect for individual rights in the 
two philosophical schools of Confucianism and Legalism in China, which  
shared a vision of society in which individual lives were led within hierarchies and social distinctions 
and proper behavior derived from an individual’s status in those hierarchies’… ‘Western thought 
makes the individual the bearer of rights and bases rights on the fundamental dignity and equality of 
every human being. There were no such concepts in Chinese thought’; in the Confucian view, ‘identity 
constantly changes, varying with the context; duties and, correspondingly, rights/rites are also 
constantly being redefined as other actors change.2  
The Confucian view of subordinating individual rights and corresponding duties to collective interests 
continues to inform many Chinese and Marxist conceptions of individual rights in modern China.3 It 
reflects patriarchal and communitarian, socialist traditions that are fundamentally different from the 
more antagonistic, Western conceptions of human and constitutional rights as constitutional constraints 
aimed at protecting diverse individuals and peoples - as ‘constituent powers’ and ‘democratic principals’ 
vis-à-vis all governance agents - by corresponding legal duties of governments with only limited, 
delegated and separated, regulatory powers. Article 51 of China’s Constitution of 19824 illustrates how 
Chinese conceptions of individual ‘freedoms and rights’ differ from ‘Kantian interpretations’ of respect 
for ‘human dignity’ in terms of equal freedoms as ‘first principle of justice’ asserting moral and 
constitutional priority over governmental limitations of the diverse civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural human and constitutional rights and corresponding governmental ‘duties to protect’. Yet, both 
Chinese and Western lawyers acknowledge that the multilevel nature of modern human rights law and 
constitutional law require respect for legitimate ‘constitutional pluralism’ depending on the diverse 
‘constitutional contracts’, democratic preferences and ratification of human rights treaties in different 
jurisdictions. As modern China and other Asian countries adopt ever more legislation and international 
agreements protecting trading rights, investment rights, intellectual property rights and other economic, 
social, constitutional and human rights, generalizations contrasting ‘rights in the East’ and in ‘the West’ 
may no longer be justifiable. For instance,  
• in 2011, China’s patent office received more patent applications than any other patent office in the 
world; 
• China also seems to comply with WTO law and WTO dispute settlement rulings as well as with 
international investment law and adjudication.  
                                                     
2  S.B.Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China after Mao, Stanford University Press 1999, 15-16, 19.  
3  Cf. J.Chan, Confucian Perfectionism. A Political Philosophy for Modern Times, Princeton University Press 2014 (arguing 
that China should adopt liberal democratic institutions that are shaped by the Confucian conception of the good rather than 
the liberal conception of equal rights). 
4  Article 51 of the 1982 Constitution sets clear limits upon the free exercise of rights by emphasizing the subordination of the 
individual to the community: ‘in exercising freedoms and rights, citizens of the People's Republic of China may not infringe 
upon the interest of the state, of society or of the collective or upon the lawful freedom and rights of other citizens’. In the 
Chinese constitutional order, human rights must conform to state-sponsored policies as determined by the communist party 
(as the ultimate elite and authority) in order to maintain the ‘social harmony between individual and state interests’ (similar 
to the Confucian emphasis on maintaining harmony inside the family as the existential unity of human relationships). 
Conflict (as opposed to social harmony) is considered an ethical and ontological evil that needs to be limited through 
proletarian ‘class struggles’ and redistribution of benefits rather than through rights-based constitutionalism and 
adjudication.  
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Yet, China has chosen a power-oriented approach disregarding China’s legal and judicial obligations 
under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).5 China’s political use of history for 
justifying its territorial and maritime claims over large swaths of the South China Sea reflects long-
standing imperial strategies reflecting the ancient Chinese board game wei qui (also known in the West 
by its Japanese name go), e.g. building artificial islands and extending military positions surrounding 
oil, gas and other natural resources aimed at occupying territories and excluding other countries without 
regard to international law (e.g. the UNCLOS provisions on exclusive economic zones and archipels). 
Also inside China, the Constitution of 1982 is not effectively enforced in domestic courts; even though 
most other UN member states have recognized constitutionalism as a reasonable self-restraint on the 
bounded rationality and ‘animal instincts’ of human beings and as the most important ‘political 
invention’ for decentralized, citizen-driven protection of public goods (PGs), China’s communist party 
avoids applying ‘national constitutionalism’ for protecting citizens against abuses of power. Yet, China 
increasingly uses legal self-commitments to UN, WTO, investment and regional law for justifying 
China’s market liberalization and regulations of non-market concerns.6 Can utilitarian OBOR 
regulations effectively protect transnational PGs (e.g. as defined by UN and WTO law) without regard 
to democratic and republican constitutionalism? 
The effectiveness of the Chinese regulatory system (e.g. for obtaining compliance with patent targets 
set by central government) has been explained in terms of an authoritarian ‘pressure driving 
mechanism’.7 Yet, China’s communist governance cannot be unilaterally imposed on other OBOR 
countries. UN human rights law and democratic constitutionalism proceed from the ‘Kantian premise’ 
that – because the limits of cognitive human reason (e.g. in terms of time, space, causality, subjective 
human senses) exclude knowledge of ‘absolute truth’ – constitutional protection of individual autonomy 
rights (e.g. to choose one’s individual conceptions of a ‘good life’ and of ‘social justice’, including 
individual and democratic freedoms to ‘falsify’ claims of truth) offer more efficient and more legitimate 
information, coordination and sanctioning mechanisms for providing private and public goods 
demanded by citizens. ‘Republican constitutionalism’ focuses on participatory rights as incentives for 
citizens to use their ‘republican virtues’ and assume responsibility for protecting collective supply of 
PGs (res publica). As illustrated by the ‘Kadi-case law’ of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) limiting 
the domestic implementation of UN Security Council ‘smart sanctions’ against alleged terrorists if such 
sanctions violate fundamental rights protected in European Union (EU) law8, multilevel judicial 
protection of rule of law in constitutional democracies is committed to interpreting also international 
treaty obligations in conformity with the fundamental rights of citizens as constitutional restraints on 
abuses of political power. Just as China has accepted multilevel trade adjudication as integral part of 
WTO law and multilevel investment adjudication as provided for in international investment 
agreements, OBOR regulations should remain consistent with multilevel judicial remedies in additional 
areas of international cooperation (like government procurement, labor rights, environmental protection) 
in order to protect transnational OBOR cooperation in accordance with UN legal guarantees accepted 
                                                     
5  See China’s rejection of the arbitration award of 12 July 2016 under UNCLOS Annex VII concerning the Chinese claims to 
control more than 80% of the South China Sea without regard to UNCLOS obligations: Permanent Court of Arbitration 
Case No 2013-19 in the matter of the South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v The Peoples Republic 
of China). The award is published on the PCA website www.pcacases.com/web/view/7. 
6  Cf. P.D.Farah/E.Cima (eds), China’s Influence on Non-Trade Concerns in International Economic Law, Routledge: New 
York 2016. Also Chinese human rights scholarship transcends Confucian Chinese traditions and Marxist ideologies in 
response to China’s ratification of UN human rights conventions and human rights discourse outside China (e.g. justifying 
human rights as protecting human freedoms, basic interests and capabilities). 
7  Cf. X.Yang, Pressure Driving Mechanism: A Concise History of the Concept, in: Social Science 2012, 11; 
W.Cheng/P.Drahos, How China Built the World’s Biggest Patent Office: The Pressure Driving Mechanism (unpublished 
manuscript 2017).  
8  On the ‘Kadi-jurisprudence’ annulling—on grounds of human rights violations—the EU implementation of ‘smart sanctions’ 
ordered by the UN Security Council against alleged terrorists, see: M. Avbelj et al. (eds.), Kadi on Trial: A Multifaceted 
Analysis of the Kadi Trial, London: Routledge, 2014.  
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by OBOR countries. Multilevel judicial governance must remain embedded into ‘republican 
constitutionalism’ in order to remain legitimate and voluntarily complied with by governmental and 
non-governmental actors and litigants. As constitutionalism is about limiting abuses of power and 
justifying third-party adjudication in terms of protecting equal rights and due process of law, the 
legitimacy of transnational OBOR cooperation is bound to depend on multilevel respect for the existing, 
international legal and constitutional obligations of OBOR countries. Even if communist rulers avoid 
‘constitutional governance’ inside China, many OBOR cooperation partners will make their 
transnational economic cooperation with China conditional on respect for the ‘constitutional principles’ 
underlying their respective national Constitutions and UN human rights law.9 
From ‘Western’ leadership for the UN/WTO legal system towards Chinese leadership through the 
OBOR project and mega-regional trade agreements? 
The OBOR project – even though primarily motivated by domestic policy goals (e.g. to improve the 
connectivity of Western China with Western trading partners) - pursues more ambitious goals to 
refashion the global economic order compared with the postwar reconstruction promoted by the US 
Marshall Plan. Yet, the postwar US leadership was embedded into US initiatives for the multilateral 
Bretton-Woods Agreements (1944) and the UN Charter (1945), as promoted by US Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull (whose leadership was rewarded by the Nobel Peace Prize in 1945).10 In the Preamble of 
the UN Charter, ‘We the Peoples of the United Nations determined’, inter alia, ‘to establish conditions 
under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international 
law can be maintained’. This rules-based, universalist US strategy (in contrast to nationalist ‘America 
First’ strategies of US President Trump) was further specified in the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) and its ‘recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family (as) the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’ 
(Preamble). Yet, the 2017 British ‘Brexit’ decision and US President Trump’s power-oriented rejection 
of multilateral agreements11 may signal the end of Anglo-Saxon leadership for protecting international 
PGs. Will China’s ‘G-20’ initiatives – at the G-20 summit in Shanghai in 2016 - for non-binding 
‘Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking’, and more recent proposals for China’s 
membership in the Transatlantic Partnership Agreement (TPP), lead to transformation of the WTO into 
a new World Investment and Trade Organization, as recently suggested by Chinese academics12 so as 
to promote more legal and institutional coherence between regional and worldwide trade and investment 
rules and institutions? 
The term ‘constitutionalism’ refers to three complementary ‘political inventions’ that respond to the 
‘bounded rationality’ of human beings and underlie also mega-regional free trade agreements (FTAs) 
like the TPP13:  
                                                     
9  On ‘economic constitutionalism’ and ‘justice as respect for human rights’ in IEL see: E.U.Petersmann, International 
Economic Law in the 21st Century. Constitutional Pluralism and Multilevel Governance of Interdependent Public Goods, 
Oxford: Hart 2012.  
10  On Cordell Hull’s strategic leadership see: K.Dam, Cordell Hull, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act and the WTO, in: 
E.U.Petersmann (ed), Reforming the World Trading System. Legitimacy, Efficiency, and Democratic Governance, Oxford 
University Press 2005, 83-98.     
11  Examples include, inter alia, Trump’s dismissal of the United Nations (UN) as a ‘social club’; his criticism of NATO as 
‘obsolete’; his support for disintegration of the EU; his withdrawal from the TPP and from the 2015 Paris Agreement on 
Climate Change Prevention; and his threatening of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and of other 
multilateral agreements. 
12  World Investment and Trade Organization: Is It Possible for Global Governance? G20, TPP and WTO, Chinese Initiative 
of International Law, WTO Public Forum September 2017.    
13  For details see: E.U.Petersmann, Multilevel Constitutionalism for Multilevel Governance of Public Goods – Methodology 
Problems in International Law, Oxford: Hart, 2016.   
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1. a legal self-commitment to constitution, limitation, regulation and justification of multilevel 
governance of PGs based on agreed ‘principles of justice’ of a higher legal rank with due respect 
for ‘constitutional pluralism’ (cf. the TPP provisions on environmental protection, good 
governance, protection of human, labor, investor and intellectual property rights and 
transnational rule of law);   
2. a political self-commitment to ‘constitutionalizing’ law and governance through (a) legislative, 
(b) administrative, (c) judicial and (d) international rules and institutions so as to institutionalize 
‘public reason’ and specify the agreed ‘principles of justice’, which – in spite of the ancient 
origins of constitutionalism – remain imperfectly realized in national and multilevel governance 
of PGs (cf. the TPP provisions on dispute settlement and domestic implementation of TPP law); 
and 
3. a methodological self-commitment (as explicitly reflected also in the Preamble and Article 31:3 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, VCLT) to interpreting and restraining the ‘rules 
of recognition, change and adjudication’ of ‘legal systems’ in conformity with human rights and 
other ‘principles of justice’ aimed at limiting abuses of power in the real constitution. 
US President Trump’s disregard for multilateral UN and trade agreements raises the question:  
Will Chinese leadership in the OBOR project help to counter the present risks of unraveling the global 
trading and economic order? Or will resistance by Chinese rulers against constitutional restraints 
limiting their ‘communist party state’ – notably their rejection of the ‘democratic ideals of 1789’ 
underlying UN and European human rights law - encourage power politics also beyond state borders 
(e.g. unilateral occupation of large parts of the South China Sea)? As globalization transforms ever more 
national into transnational PGs14 which no single state can protect unilaterally without international 
law and multilevel governance institutions: Can the multilevel OBOR governance be constituted, 
limited, regulated and justified without ‘multilevel constitutionalism’ through ‘bilateral deals’ 
(following the power-oriented policy paradigm of US President Trump)? Who protects the universally 
recognized civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of citizens if ‘the sovereign sleeps’15 and 
transnational PGs (like mutually beneficial monetary, trading, investment, environmental, security and 
rule-of-law systems) are governed through ever more complex ‘networks’ (like global markets and 
‘supply chains’ for international production of goods) driven by interest group politics? Can the 
‘disconnect’ of the intergovernmental UN/WTO governance from citizens and peoples as ‘constituent 
powers’ and ‘democratic principals’ of all governance agents be limited so as to better protect human 
rights, rule of law and democratic governance in UN/WTO practices? Are authoritarian rulers right that 
economic poverty may justify prioritizing ‘justice as economic efficiency’16 over protecting ‘justice as 
                                                     
14  Economists tend to define pure ‘PGs’ (like sunshine, clean air, inalienable human rights) by their non-rival and non-
excludable use that prevents their production in private markets. Most PGs are ‘impure’ in the sense of being either non-
rival (e.g. ‘club goods’) or non-excludable (like common pool resources). Political and legal ‘republican theories’ tend to 
focus on whether republican ‘common goods’ for everyone (in contrast to the diverse private interests of citizens) are 
defined and implemented through participatory procedures and democratic conceptions of public interests (e.g. in 
protecting the republican values of ‘freedom as non-domination’, political equality, self-government and ‘civic virtues’ of 
citizens). On the different kinds and ‘collective action problems’ of PGs see Petersmann (note 13).  
15  The distinction between ‘sovereignty’ and ‘government’ appointed by the sovereign people was increasingly discussed since 
the 16th century in view of the impossibility of applying the Athenian model of permanent self-governance through 
democratic assemblies in city-republics to nation states with vast territories and people. Hobbes’s suggestion (in De Cive, 
1642) that the sovereign – after appointing a government – may be considered as ‘sleeping’, contributed to the invention, 
in the 18th century, of ‘constitutional democracy’ constituting, limiting, regulating and justifying limited government 
powers through democratically agreed, constitutional rules of a higher legal rank and constitutional rights of citizens aimed 
at ‘constitutionalizing’ the overall structures of society; cf. R.Tuck, The Sleeping Sovereign: The Invention of Modern 
Democracy, Cambridge University Press 2016.    
16  By treating citizens as mere objects of governmental ‘utility maximization’ and neglecting human rights, utilitarian focus 
on efficient production and distribution offers no guarantee for taking into account the non-economic dimensions of human 
welfare, for instance whenever restrictive business practices or emergency situations increase prices depriving poor people 
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human rights’? Is the ‘invisible hand development paradigm’ (e.g. the assumption that private market 
competition and private law coordination can produce PGs) consistent with the universal recognition of 
human rights and with the need for reducing unnecessary poverty and environmental destruction?17    
Why the legitimacy of OBOR law and governance depends on constitutionalism 
Can the OBOR project be successfully designed and implemented on purely utilitarian principles of 
governance? Bilateral ‘OBOR deals’ between China and recipient countries risk conflicting with 
existing multilateral agreements, as recently recalled by the EU investigations into China’s construction 
of a railway link between Belgrade and Budapest and its alleged violation of EU regulations stipulating 
public tenders for large transport projects. 
The insight that human rights and constitutionalism promote ‘reasonableness’ and limit rational egoism 
of individuals underlies UN human rights conventions that are ratified also by China (e.g. the UN 
Covenant on economic, social and cultural rights). The conferral of the 2017 Nobel Prize for economics 
to R. Taler ‘for his contribution to behavioral economics’ reflects similar economic insights that 
‘bounded rationality’ - for instance by the selfish homo economicus maximizing individual preferences 
through cost-benefit calculations in economic markets as well as in ‘political markets’ - remains part of 
the ‘human condition’ shaping also economic behavior, such as human responses to the ‘three 
principles’ of  
• ‘thinking automatically’ (e.g. ‘fast’ and ‘spontaneous’ rather than ‘deliberative’ and ‘reasonable 
slow thinking’);  
• ‘thinking socially’ (e.g. adjusting to social contexts of corruption); and  
• ‘thinking with mental models’ that depend on the situation and the culture (e.g. in under-regulated 
financial industries profiting from tax-avoidance and circumvention of the law).18    
Constitutionalism is a rational response to this ‘human condition’ (like risks of rational egoism and of 
limited human reasonableness) by committing all human beings and citizens to respect for equal human 
rights, rule of law, democratic input-legitimacy, republican output-legitimacy, inclusive democratic 
rule-justifications, and democratic and judicial accountability. Also beyond state borders, republican 
and cosmopolitan constitutionalism includes and protects persons and citizens affected by public and 
private power through equal rights and remedies in multilevel ‘bottom-up governance’ of transnational 
PGs (like the international division of labor based on ‘global supply chains’).19 The EU law principles 
of multilevel legal and judicial protection of  
                                                     
of effective access to water, essential food and medical services. The utilitarian assumption that morality consists in 
weighing and aggregating costs and benefits so as to ‘maximize happiness’ (e.g., by governmental redistribution of the 
‘gains from trade’ at the whim of the rulers) risks being inconsistent with the moral principles underlying modern human 
rights (like respect for human dignity and ‘inalienable’ human rights). 
17  For a famous criticism of the privatization and ‘commodification’ of natural resources, human resources and financial 
resources see the 1944 book by K.Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time 
(new edition, with an Introduction by J.Stiglitz, Boston: Beacon Press, 2004). For a criticism of the regulatory neglect of 
‘market failures’ and ‘governance failures’ in UN/WTO law see: Petersmann (note 9).  
18  Cf. World Development Report 2015: Mind, Society and Behavior, Washington: World Bank 2015 (discussing rational 
choice theory, behavioral economics, public choice and deliberative democracy theories on how individuals, institutions, 
and societies make legally relevant decisions, enact laws, or adapt to them).  
19  Kantian arguments for constitutional, cosmopolitan and international rights to equal freedoms are based not only on moral 
'categorical imperatives' and a priori reasons for reconciling 'the choice of one … with the choice of another in accordance 
with a universal law of freedom' (I.Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge UP 1996, at 230). Kant also argued that 
a peaceful international order can be developed only through cosmopolitan law (‘Weltbürgerrecht’) that transforms the 
classical law among nations (‘Völkerrecht’) through multilevel constitutional guarantees of equal cosmopolitan rights of 
citizens; cf. J.Bohman and M.Lutz-Bachmann (eds), Perpetual Peace. Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal, Cambridge 
University Press 1997. Regional economic integration law among the 28 EU member states and its promotion of 
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• fundamental rights (e.g. as protected in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as integral part of 
the 2009 Lisbon Treaty and European constitutional law);  
• of constitutional, representative, participatory and deliberative democracy (cf. Articles 2, 9-12 
TEU); and of  
• related constitutional principles (e.g. of conferral of limited powers, subsidiarity, proportionality, 
rule of law)  
may offer the most developed ‘multilevel constitutional law for multilevel governance of PGs.’20 Yet, 
just as Britain and the USA remain reluctant to limit their national sovereignty by multilevel governance 
and judicial institutions, so are many Asian governments rejecting European constitutional law as a 
model for cooperation among Asian countries with different legal and cultural traditions. Such insistence 
on diversity and ‘constitutional pluralism’ must be respected. Yet, Chinese citizens should not forget 
their own historical experiences that the widespread poverty inside China – during the decades prior to 
its economic liberalization policies since 1978 - was unnecessary and caused by ‘government failures’. 
Just as China’s self-commitment to GATT/WTO law helped lifting hundreds of millions of poor people 
out of poverty by embedding the ‘open door policies’ initiated by President Deng Xiaoping into the 
legal framework of GATT/WTO, so could embedding of China’s OBOR project into multilateral trade, 
investment and regional agreements contribute to legitimizing OBOR governance and related 
adjudication through multilevel legal restraints on ‘market failures’ and ‘government failures’ inducing 
private and public, national and transnational actors to limit their rational pursuit of self-interests.21  
Constitutional pluralism calls for respecting the diversity of ‘principles of justice’   
Constitutionalism is about ‘imagined orders’ based on inter-subjectively shared beliefs (e.g. ‘social 
contracts’) rather than about objective ‘truth’. It must respect culturally diverse traditions of 
‘constitutional pluralism’ and of legitimate contestation, for instance  
• by foreign ‘market citizens’ contesting discrimination of foreigners; or 
• by ‘cosmopolitan citizens’ challenging harmful ‘externalities’ (like transboundary pollution and 
climate change) and related ‘discourse failures’ in foreign jurisdictions (e.g. in US politics 
disregarding global PGs like climate change).  
By empowering citizens and foreigners to locally engage with, invoke and enforce international rules 
and human rights in domestic jurisdictions, ‘cosmopolitan constitutionalism’ can promote the legal 
coherence and effectiveness of multilevel regulation and judicial protection of transnational PGs.22 
Theories and ‘principles of justice’ differ according to the diverse ‘contexts of justice’. For example, 
• dispute settlement procedures may be justified by diverse principles of ‘procedural justice’;  
• constitutional assemblies and courts of justice may be designed very differently depending on the 
agreed principles of ‘constitutional justice’;  
• the allocation of equal civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of citizens may be 
justified by different principles of ‘distributive justice’;  
                                                     
‘cosmopolitan rights’ and  'democratic peace' during more than 60 years are often seen as empirical evidence confirming 
Kantian legal philosophy.       
20  Cf. Petersmann (note 13).  
21  On the increasing references to human rights in investor-state arbitration see: V.Kube/ E.U.Petersmann, Human Rights Law 
in International Investment Arbitration, in: Asian Journal for WTO & Health Law and Policy 11 (2016), 67-116.   
22  Cf. E.U.Petersmann, Cosmopolitan constitutionalism: linking local engagement with international economic law and human 
rights, in: L.Biukovic/P.Pitman (eds), Local Engagement with International Economic Law and Human Rights, 
Cheltenham: Elgar Publishing 2017, 26-54. 
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• principles of ‘corrective justice’ may justify very different remedies (e.g. retrospective reparation 
of injury in investment courts, only prospective remedies in WTO dispute settlement procedures);   
• principles of ‘commutative justice’ may justify particular interpretations of contractually agreed 
rights, duties and reciprocity principles (as illustrated by the ‘violation’, ‘non-violation’ and 
‘situation complaints’ provided for in Article XXIII GATT); and  
• ‘equity principles’ may justify particular legal and judicial responses to unforeseen challenges. 23  
Impartial third-party adjudication is a much older paradigm of ‘constitutional justice’ than democratic 
‘constitutional contracts’. Impartial ‘courts of justice’ fit republican, cosmopolitan and economic 
definitions of ‘PGs’ (e.g. in terms of non-exclusive and non-exhaustive access for all) and are essential 
for legitimizing legal regulation also of OBOR projects involving countries with diverse legal traditions. 
‘Constitutional justice’ principles, including UN legal principles, aim at limiting power-oriented 
conceptions of ‘PGs’ (e.g. unilateral occupation of large parts of the South China Sea in violation of 
UNCLOS obligations) and of majoritarian politics. Constitutionalism requires international and 
domestic courts and their participation in multilevel governance of ‘PGs treaties’ so that treaty 
interpretations remain justifiable ‘in conformity with the principles of justice’, including also ‘human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all’, as recalled in the Preamble and Article 31 of the 1969 VCLT. 
National and regional courts throughout Europe - like the CJEU, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) 
Court, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and national courts cooperating with these 
European courts – are all committed to ‘constitutional methodologies’ aimed at protecting fundamental 
rights of citizens and transnational rule of law based on coherent ‘principles of justice’ respecting the 
legitimacy of ‘constitutional pluralism’ and of legal diversity. Yet, the legal and judicial traditions in 
many African and Asian countries are obviously different and may legitimately prioritize alternative 
dispute resolution methodologies. 
EU law illustrates how democratic, cosmopolitan and judicial conceptions of ‘constitutional justice’ can 
complement each other in justifying citizen-oriented, multilevel governance of transnational PGs and of 
‘common pool resources’. The universal recognition of ‘inalienable’ human rights and fundamental 
freedoms calls for interpreting the rights of citizens and peoples and the corresponding duties of states, 
governments and international organizations as reciprocal principal-agent relationships.24 Chinese law 
and the Chinese OBOR initiative could be strengthened and legitimized through ‘republican 
constitutionalism’ recognizing and empowering citizens as owners of PGs. By embedding principles of 
procedural, distributive, corrective, commutative justice and equity into ‘constitutional justice 
principles’, modern international law and multilevel governance of PGs can be designed more 
legitimately and more effectively, for instance by limiting ‘constitutional nationalism’ through 
multilevel protection of citizens across national frontiers. Complementing ‘republican’ by ‘economic 
conceptions’ of PGs can help clarify the collective action problems impeding ‘constitutional justice’ 
(e.g. in common market and competition law). Citizens must hold rulers more accountable for justifying 
their widespread disregard for the customary rules of treaty interpretation so that ‘PGs treaties’ are 
construed as protecting rights not only of governments, but also of citizens as the main economic actors, 
‘democratic principals’ and ‘constituent powers’ of multilevel governance agents. As illustrated by 
widespread corruption problems and civil society contestation of law and governance in many OBOR 
countries, the voluntary compliance by private and public actors with multilevel ‘OBOR regulations’ 
will depend no less on bottom-up support by civil society of ‘just rules’ than on legal and judicial 
attempts at their ‘top-down enforcement’ by governance institutions.  
                                                     
23  Cf. R.Forst, Contexts of Justice: Political Philosophy beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism, Berkeley: University of 
California Press 2002.    
24  On this need for reconciling the three competing conceptions of ‘international law among states’, ‘international law among 
peoples’, and ‘cosmopolitan international law based on universal human rights’ see: E.U.Petersmann, Human Rights, 
International Economic Law and ‘Constitutional Justice’, in: European Journal of International Law 19 (2008), 769-798.  
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Legal methodology problems of trade and investment adjudication involving silk road 
projects  
The term ‘legal methodology’ refers to the ‘best way’ for identifying law, the methods of legal 
interpretation, the ‘primary rules of conduct’ and ‘secondary rules of recognition, change and 
adjudication’, the relationship between ‘legal positivism’, ‘natural law’ and ‘social theories of law’, and 
the ‘dual nature’ of modern legal systems. The etymological origins of the word methodology - i.e. the 
Greek word ‘meta-hodos’, referring to ‘following the road’ - suggest that globalization and multilevel 
governance of ‘transnational PGs’ (like human rights, rule of law, democratic peace, mutually 
beneficial monetary, trading, development, environmental, communication and legal systems promoting 
‘sustainable development’) require reviewing legal methodologies in order to find ‘better ways’ 
enabling citizens and peoples to increase their social welfare through rules-based global cooperation.  
Section I explained why constitutionalism – as (1) a normative conception for the input-legitimacy of 
public law, a (2) sociological conception for the output legitimacy of public law, and as (3) a legal 
methodology for interpreting and developing PGs systems – has proven to be the most important 
‘political invention’ for protecting PGs both inside and beyond states. Constitutionalism suggests that 
law – including IEL and regulations of OBOR projects – must be understood and developed with due 
regard to the dynamic interactions between the ‘law in the books’, the ‘law in action’, and the underlying 
‘principles of justice’ justifying law and governance vis-à-vis citizens. Transforming national into 
multilevel constitutionalism is required, inter alia, by  
• the universal recognition of human rights25;  
• the transformation of national into transnational PGs due to globalization;  
• the need for limiting ‘collective action problems’ in multilevel governance of transnational 
‘aggregate PGs’; and by the 
• the greater effectiveness of citizen-driven ’bottom-up network governance’ compared with 
intergovernmental ‘top-down chessboard governance’26 or authoritarian ‘pressure driving 
mechanisms’.27  
This comparatively greater effectiveness of ‘cosmopolitan international law’ empowering citizens at 
home and abroad is illustrated by numerous empirical examples like: 
• national and international contract, commercial and investment law (e.g. protecting ‘global supply 
chains’) enforced through multilevel cooperation among national and international tribunals (e.g. 
                                                     
25  Similar to the recognition of the ‘trinity’ of human rights, rule of law and democratic governance inside constitutional 
democracies and in an increasing number of regional institutions (like the EU and the Council of Europe), also UN 
institutions recognize ‘that human rights, the rule of law and democracy are interlinked and mutually reinforcing and that 
they belong to the universal and indivisible core values and principles of the United Nations’ (UN GA Res. 64/116 of 15 
January 2010). From the point of view of legal methodology, it remains contested whether democratic governance and rule 
of law can be deduced - as principles of positive international law - from the government obligations to respect, protect and 
fulfil human rights; or whether –in order to become positive international law – they must be inductively proven to have 
also been specifically endorsed by states, for instance in the numerous UN and regional human rights conventions and 
related resolutions of UN and regional institutions recognizing legal duties to democratic exercise of governance powers. 
Arguably, both the inductive as well as the deductive methodology justify the same conclusion that – since the UDHR of 
1948 - all UN member states have consented to UN and regional treaties and resolutions recognizing legal duties to protect 
democratic governance and related human rights (like freedom of opinion, freedom of assembly, freedoms to participate in 
representative governments and in regular elections of democratic institutions).     
26  Cf. A.M.Slaugther, The Chess-Board and the Web. Strategies of Connection in a Networked World, New Haven: Yale 
University Press 2017 (elaborating strategies for designing, improving and managing social networks for resolving 
collective action problems at local, national and transnational levels of governance).   
27  See above note 7.  
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based on the 1958 New York Convention and the 1966 Convention establishing the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID);  
• rights-based common market, competition, labour laws and environmental regulations as enforced 
by the CJEU and the EFTA Court in cooperation with national courts;  
• regional human rights regimes enforced by national and regional human rights courts (e.g. in 
Africa, Europe and Latin-America);  
• international criminal law as enforced through multilevel cooperation among national and 
international criminal courts;  
• multilevel tobacco control regulations in the context of the World Health Organization (WHO) 
and its Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)28; 
• internet regulation and its decentralized enforcement through multilevel arbitration procedures 
(e.g. administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO); or  
• consular and refugee regulations protecting individual rights and judicial remedies.29 
From democratic, republican and cosmopolitan constitutionalism to ‘constitutional pluralism’ 
Since the Athenian democracy and the Roman republic some 2500 years ago, constitutionalism 
continues to dynamically evolve in response to diverse legal cultures, regulatory contexts and ‘collective 
action problems’. For instance:  
• Emancipatory ‘constitutionalism 1.0’ constituted, limited, regulated and justified legislative, 
executive and judicial powers for republican (self)government (e.g. from the Athenian democracy 
and Roman republic to the Constitutions of the USA 1787, India 1949 and China 1982).    
• The post-World War II ‘human rights constitutionalism 2.0’ further limited governance powers 
by multilevel human rights and judicial remedies (notably in European law); yet it failed to 
effectively ‘constitutionalize’ foreign policy powers (e.g. in UN/GATT politics) that often 
continue to tax, restrict and regulate citizens in their transnational cooperation without effective 
protection of human rights, rule of law and democratic self-governance. 
• Multilevel ‘EU constitutionalism 3.0’ (e.g. based on Articles 2, 3, 6, 21 Lisbon Treaty and the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights) succeeded in ‘constitutionalizing’ the common market integration 
and some foreign policy areas (as illustrated by the Kadi-jurisprudence and the European 
Economic Area Agreement between the EU and EFTA member states).30 
Section I argued that globalization and its transformation of national into transnational PGs (like human 
rights, open monetary, trading, investment, legal security and environmental protection systems) require 
‘cosmopolitan UN/WTO constitutionalism 4.0’. UN/WTO governance of global PGs remains, however, 
legally ‘disconnected’ from effective democratic control, ‘cosmopolitan rights’ and judicial remedies of 
citizens. Due to inadequate restraints on foreign policy powers, intergovernmental power politics 
continues to prevail over citizen-oriented ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘constitutional conceptions’ of UN/WTO 
law and governance. The ‘America First’ policies of US President Trump illustrate how governments 
and diplomats often pursue rational self-interests (e.g. in satisfying domestic interest groups in exchange 
                                                     
28  On their multilevel judicial enforcement see: L.Gruszczynski, The WTO and FCTC Dispute Settlement Systems: Friends or 
Foes? in: Asian Journal of WTO & Health Law and Policy 12 (March 2017) 105-134.   
29  For empirical evidence confirming the greater effectiveness of citizen-driven ‘cosmopolitan inernational law’ empowering 
citizens through individual rights, remedies and ‘network governance’ see: R.Pierik/W.Werner (eds), Cosmopolitanism in 
Context. Perspectives from International Law and Political Theory, Cambridge University Press 2010; Petersmann (note 
13), at 59 ff, 321 ff. 
30  For different distinctions between ‘constitutionalism 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0’ see: A.Somek, The Cosmopolitan Constitution, Oxford 
University Press 2014.      
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for their political support, limiting the legal and judicial accountability of foreign policies vis-à-vis 
adversely affected citizens). ‘Global democracy’, ‘global justice’, diplomatic and inter-governmental 
‘top-down UN/WTO constitutionalism’ remain utopias. Yet, the historical evolution from 
‘constitutionalism 1.0’ to democratic ‘European constitutionalism 3.0’ suggests that functionally limited 
‘multilevel constitutionalism 4.0’ may be a politically realistic methodology for making multilevel 
governance of transnational PGs more legitimate and effective, for instance by setting incentives for 
civil society support of transnational PGs regimes limiting toxic tobacco consumption (e.g. in the 
context of the 2003 FCTC) and climate change (e.g. in the context of the 2015 Paris Agreement). 
Arguably, also European constitutional law offers lessons for extending ‘republican’ and ‘cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism’ beyond national borders; even in different legal contexts of transnational economic 
cooperation among national republics without effective ‘democratic constitutionalism’ (e.g. among 
China and Pakistan in the context of their OBOR cooperation), citizen-driven ‘republican  
constitutionalism’ and inclusive decision-making processes can limit ‘collective action problems’ in 
multilevel governance of transnational PGs (like the OBOR project of building transnational 
infrastructures connecting China with Afghanistan and Pakistan across areas dominated by militant local 
tribes). For instance:  
• constitutional and ‘cosmopolitan interpretations’ of multilevel trade and investment regulations 
(e.g. by national and international courts of justice) can protect legal rights and judicial remedies 
of non-governmental actors and transnational rule of law, thereby limiting abuses of public and 
private powers; 
• as illustrated by European economic integration law, legal empowerment of ‘citizen struggles for 
justice’ can promote other PGs like undistorted market competition and ‘democratic peace’; 
• the customary law requirements of treaty interpretation ‘in conformity with the principles of 
justice’, including also ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’ (as codified in the 
Preamble and Article 31 VCLT), can promote multilevel ‘judicial dialogues’ and strengthen 
the ‘instrumental’ and ’systemic functions’ of law as well as the input- and output legitimacy of 
intergovernmental law-making and multilevel governance.  
How to design OBOR dispute settlement procedures? 
The effectiveness of international courts of justice and of their multilevel cooperation with national 
courts is evaluated best by a ‘goal-based approach’31 that examines not only the compliance with court 
judgments (which may depend more on the nature of remedies issued by a court than on the perceived 
quality of the court’s procedures and reasoning), the usage rates of courts (which may be low due to 
dispute avoidance through out-of-courts settlements), and the impact of courts on state conduct (e.g. 
compliance with minimalist judicial remedies that may fail to protect agreed treaty objectives 
effectively). Most international courts are mandated to also pursue broader goals such as: 
• applying, interpreting and, if necessary, clarifying and enforcing the applicable international law 
rules and principles so as to strengthen the rule-of-law in the competent jurisdictions; 
• resolving international disputes and related legal problems; 
• supporting the operation of related international legal regimes; and 
• legitimizing related rules and institutions. 
International judicial effectiveness in realizing the legal and judicial dispute settlement objectives may 
depend on numerous other factors like the interests of state parties, interest groups and affected 
individuals; the tribunal’s composition, formal authority (e.g. to compel compliance with the law), 
independence, human and financial resources; the reputation, functional capacity (e.g. depending on 
                                                     
31  Cf. Y.Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts : A Goal-Based Approach, in : American Journal of 
International Law 106 (2012), 225-270.   
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assistant staff and case-load) and fact-finding capability of tribunals; their persuasive judicial reasoning, 
‘judicial dialogues’ (e.g. with the disputing parties, third parties and other courts with ‘overlapping 
jurisdictions’), the nature of the rules and rule-violations concerned, and on judicial cooperation with 
domestic institutions concerned.32  
So far, the OBOR project does not envisage establishment of new national or international dispute 
settlement venues with specific dispute settlement goals, structures, processes, outcomes, stakeholders 
and constituencies (e.g. bearing the costs of permanent tribunals). As the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding pursues ‘providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system’ (Article 
3 DSU) and most countries participating in the OBOR project are WTO member states, the WTO trade, 
investment, government procurement and dispute settlement rules and procedures might offer the most 
appropriate jurisdiction for settling related disputes also among countries cooperating in OBOR 
projects.33 Similarly, as bilateral and regional investment rules and arbitration procedures aim at 
protecting and reconciling both the public interests of the home and host states involved as well as the 
private interests of foreign investors (e.g. in full security of their property and investor rights), 
investment disputes arising from the implementation of OBOR projects might be submitted to existing 
investment jurisdictions (e.g. based on the more than 130 investment treaties concluded by China with 
other countries).34 The private contract and commercial law disputes arising from joint ventures and 
other cooperation among Chinese and foreign companies and investors may be submitted and resolved 
most effectively by submission to one of the numerous private commercial law centers and established 
arbitration procedures in China and other countries attracting OBOR investment projects.35 To the extent 
OBOR projects are financed by international and national development banks (like China Development 
Bank, a state lender which already granted loans worth more than $160bn to countries involved in 
OBOR projects), such financing is usually based on contracts incorporating the public procurement 
regulations of the banks concerned and requiring borrowers and contractors to use such procedures for 
funded procurements.36 Comparative studies of recent arbitration reforms and of alternative dispute 
                                                     
32  Cf. L.Helfer/A.M.Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective International Adjudication, in : Yale Law Journal 107 (1997), at 
273 ff.   
33  If the WTO dispute settlement system is evaluated from the perspective of its much more frequent use by WTO Members 
since 1995 (e.g. 524 regular requests for consultations, 56 additional ‘compliance disputes’ pursuant to Article 21.5 DSU, 
over 350 WTO dispute settlement decisions issued by May 2017) compared with other worldwide dispute settlement 
systems (e.g. only 23 cases and 6 verdicts issued by the International Criminal Court since 2002; only 25 cases dealt with 
by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea since 1995), statistical analyses confirm the comparatively ‘prompt 
settlement’ of disputes ‘essential to the effective functioning of the WTO’ (Article 3:3 DSU). Yet, the WTO dispute 
settlement system remains subject to power politics (e.g. political refusal to provide adequate legal and translation staff 
enabling compliance with the very tight DSU deadlines for WTO panel and Appellate Body proceedings) and to delaying 
tactics (e.g. more than 90% of the 33 ‘compliance panels’ pursuant to Article 21.5 DSU found that the WTO member 
concerned had not complied fully with the DSB ruling, triggering subsequent requests in 21 of these disputes for DSB 
authorization of ‘suspension of concessions’ as countermeasures, notably against the USA and the EU). Moreover, in 27 
out of 122 reports issued by the WTO Appellate Body, the latter was unable ‘to complete the analysis’ and, after having 
(partially) reversed the panel’s findings, to resolve the dispute by remanding it back to the original WTO panel. However, 
evaluating the WTO dispute settlement system from a different benchmark than its frequent use and comparatively speedy 
dispute settlement (e.g. since 2013 about 34 months duration of WTO dispute settlement proceedings) – e.g. in the light of 
Article 3:2 DSU (‘providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system’; ‘clarify the existing provisions 
of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law’) -, could justify more 
criticism (e.g. in terms of neglecting the customary law requirement of interpreting treaties in conformity with ‘human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all’, as recalled in the Preamble and Article 31:3 of the VCLT).  
34  Cf. J.Chaisse (ed), China’s Three-Prong Investment Strategy: Bilateral, Regional and Global Tracks, Oxford University 
Press 2017.   
35  Cf. J.Paulsson (ed), International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration, 4 volumes, The Hague: Kluwer, 2015 (describing 
commercial arbitration in China in Vol. 1).     
36  Cf. S.Williams-Elegbe, Public Procurement and Multilateral Development Banks. Law, Practice and Problems, Oxford : 
Hart, 2017.    
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann 
14 Department of Law Working Papers 
resolution methods in Asian countries identify new Asian approaches to modernization of arbitration 
and mediation procedures.37  
Legitimacy challenges of international trade and investment adjudication 
Legitimacy of courts (e.g. understood as socially accepted authority) depends not only on the internal 
rules constituting the legal regimes in which the courts operate. It is also influenced by the ‘principles 
of justice’ underlying and embedding legal and judicial systems. Judicial jurisprudence may generate 
additional legitimacy promoting social acceptance by the constituencies concerned.38 Due to the lack of 
judicial independence inside China’s ‘communist party state’, many foreign actors perceive the ‘source 
legitimacy’, ‘procedural legitimacy’ and ‘result-based legitimacy’ of Chinese courts as inadequate, even 
if national courts inside China offer ‘low cost judgments’ compared with more expensive arbitration or 
international dispute settlement procedures. Comparative studies of international trade and investment 
courts point to both ‘converging developments’ (e.g. in judicial interpretations of national treatment and 
most-favored nation treatment obligations in trade and investment agreements, proportionality 
balancing) and ‘diverging structures’ (e.g. regarding prospective remedies in WTO dispute settlement 
procedures, retroactive reparation of injury in investment arbitration, cooperation between national 
courts and investment arbitral tribunals, lack of cooperation among national and WTO trade tribunals).39 
Evaluating the legitimacy and comparative advantages of national, regional and worldwide trade and 
investment courts and of their increasing interactions raises also political, sociological and moral 
legitimacy questions going beyond ‘positive law’40, for instance whether the legitimacy of international 
courts is ultimately a matter of justifiability towards individuals (e.g. in terms of protecting citizens 
against arbitrary domination, protecting equal freedoms as individual rights) rather than only vis-à-vis 
government agents representing states (e.g. in terms of helping them solve collective action problems).41 
The behavior of international judges is influenced not only by law, but also by political constraints and 
uncertainty depending on their independence, accountability, and the multilevel allocation and 
separation of powers (e.g. regarding the reappointment of WTO Appellate Body judges and the adoption 
of Appellate Body reports by the political WTO Dispute Settlement Body). The recent ‘blockage’ of the 
re-appointment of WTO Appellate Body judges by the USA - based on US claims that they have 
‘exceeded their mandates’ - reflects regrettable US power politics disregarding their DSU obligations 
(e.g. under Article 23:1) and the legitimate use of the customary rules of treaty interpretation by the 
Appellate Body (as required by Article 3:2 DSU).  
The election of authoritarian, political leaders and their ‘populist policies’ have recently led to increasing 
criticism of international courts, for instance by the US Trump administration (criticizing independent 
WTO adjudication), China (rejecting the arbitral jurisdiction and awards under the UNCLOS), Britain 
(rejecting the jurisdiction of the CJEU beyond April 2019, i.e. the presumed entry into force of Britain’s 
‘Brexit’, and criticizing the jurisdiction of the ECtHR), as well as by European civil society (e.g. 
opposing the limitation of national court jurisdictions in favor of investor-state arbitration privileging 
                                                     
37  Cf. A.Reyes/W.Gu (eds), The Developing World of Arbitration. A Comparative Study of Arbitration Reform in the Asia 
Pacific, Oxford: Hart Publishing 2018.   
38  On ad hoc responses of investment arbitrators responding, e.g., to WTO Appellate Body jurisprudence and ‘judicial 
proportionality’ reasoning in European courts see : D.Schneiderman, Legitimacy and Reflexivity in International 
Investment Arbitration : A New Self-Restraint ? in : Journal of International Dispute Resolution 2 (2011), 471-495.    
39  Cf. J.Kurtz, The WTO and International Investment Law. Converging Systems, Cambridge University Press 2016 ; Y.Hua 
(note 3). 
40  Cf. G.Ulfstein/M.Zhang/R.Howse/H.Ruiz-Fabri (eds), The Legitimacy of International Trade Courts and Tribunals, 
Cambridge University Press 2017.   
41  Cf. E.U.Petersmann, International dispute settlement and the position of individuals under EU and international law, in: 
M.Cremona/R.Wessels (eds),The European Union and International Dispute Settlement, Oxford: Hart 2017, 213-234.    
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foreign investors).42 The horizontal and vertical allocation of judicial authority, its accountability, 
democratic control, moral justification and judicial interpretation of indeterminate ‘legal principles’ will 
inevitably remain contested also in the implementation of China’s OBOR projects, for instance 
depending on whether international courts will be socially accepted also by non-governmental actors as 
judicial promoters of ‘justice’, rule-of-law and other PGs. Future legal and judicial practices in the 
implementation of OBOR projects will help to discover comparative advantages and ‘best practices’ of 
alternative judicial, mediation and conciliation procedures and multilevel institutions for dispute 
settlement. 
Some policy conclusions for the ‘OBOR’ project 
The legitimacy of economic, financial and investment cooperation in the implementation of OBOR 
projects depends on rules-based legal frameworks, impartial dispute settlement procedures, 
predictability and compliance of governance with the ‘rule of law’ as ‘a principle of governance in which 
all persons, institutions and entities, … including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly 
promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with 
international human rights norms and standards’ that have become part of universally recognized human 
rights principles.43  
China’s leadership in the OBOR project (e.g. as main provider of financial and technical resources, 
goods and services for OBOR projects) seems to entail predominantly bilateral legal structures without 
creation of new multilateral courts, multilateral political control mechanisms and new multilateral 
treaties protecting non-state actors. Hence, decentralized judicial institutions and coordination 
mechanisms (e.g. litis pendens principles for preventing simultaneous cases before competing courts, 
res judicata principles preventing subsequent cases before different courts, judicial comity principles 
promoting judicial dialogues and regard to precedents), judicial independence, bilateral or plurilateral 
procurement procedures, investment protection and dispute settlement agreements may be more 
appropriate in view of the enormous diversity of the more than 60 countries participating in OBOR 
projects. Even if governments remain the ‘masters’ of intergovernmental OBOR projects, 
implementation of the infrastructure, investment and economic projects depends on non-state actors and 
civil society interested in ‘non-domination’44; they are likely to evaluate the normative legitimacy and 
social acceptability of OBOR rules, institutions and projects from diverse local perspectives. Protecting 
legitimate rights and interests of non-governmental actors and local ‘compliance communities’ (e.g. 
interested in non-domination, protection of legitimate expectations, respect for human rights and rule of 
law) and promoting the ‘inner morality of law’ will be important for successful implementation of 
OBOR projects and voluntary compliance with related contracts.45 
                                                     
42  Cf. E.U.Petersmann, Transatlantic Free Trade Agreements: Lack of EU Leadership for Reforming Trade and Investment 
Law? in: Revue Internationale de Droit Economique 2016, 455-480.    
43  UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/67/97 (2012) on ‘The Rule of Law at National and International Levels’.    
44  On ‘rule of men’ as domination, and ‘rule of law’ as non-domination, see: P.Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom 
and Government, Oxford University Press 1997. According to Pettit, republicanism pursues non-domination in the sense 
of ‘protection from the arbitrary use of political authority and coercive power’. For broader conceptions of republicanism 
focusing on multilevel governance of PGs see Petersmann (note 13).    
45  On the ‘two moralities of duty and of aspiration’, the ‘inner morality of law’ and related procedural and substantive ‘rule of 
law criteria’ (e.g. based on principles of general applicability, promulgation of rules, their non-retroactivity, clarity, 
consistency, respect for human capabilities, stare decisis, and congruence) see: L.L.Fuller, The Morality of Law, Yale 
University Press revised edition 1969. On the need for socially constructing law ‘bottom up’ by involving all citizens and 
actors concerned in the making, administration and adjudication of (inter)national rules see: J.Brunée/S.J.Toope, 
Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account, Cambridge University Press 2010, at 86 : 
‘Interactional law only emerges when shared understandings become fused with a ‘practice of legality’, rooted in Fuller’s 
eight criteria of legality and embraced by a community of practice that adheres to those criteria in day-to-day decision-
making’. On Fuller’s ‘inner morality of law criteria’ as constitutive elements of ‘legality’ and rule-of-law see Fuller, at 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann 
16 Department of Law Working Papers 
As national courts in China and in some other OBOR partner countries are widely perceived as failing 
adequate legitimacy standards (like judicial independence from political interferences, impartiality, due 
process of law, legal expertise in international law), the international agreements and economic contracts 
governing the relationships between OBOR donor and recipient countries, investors and their 
contractors should provide for the existing dispute settlement procedures in international trade, 
investment, commercial and contract law rather than for submission of disputes to national jurisdictions. 
The ‘Chinese initiative’ for joining the TPP Agreement and multilateralizing mega-regional FTAs 
among WTO members deserves support by OBOR partner countries as the most efficient way of 
reforming WTO law.46 The Chinese traditions favoring alternative dispute resolution methods (like 
mediation and conciliation procedures) should be institutionalized at national and regional levels of 
OBOR cooperation. Subsidiarity principles are important in designing dispute settlement procedures 
among and within constitutional democracies provided their national courts are subject to effective 
constitutional restraints (e.g. in EU and EEA countries cooperating in OBOR projects). In countries 
without ‘republican constitutionalism’, however, constraining national governance institutions through 
international legal and judicial commitments (e.g. WTO law, international investment law) can improve 
domestic institutions, enhance legal security and reduce transaction costs, for instance by resorting to 
‘positive complementarity principles’ based on cooperation between national and transnational courts 
and tribunals (like recognition and enforcement by national courts of transnational arbitral awards and 
international judgments). Multilevel judicial cooperation between international and national courts (e.g. 
based on ‘preliminary rulings’ by the CJEU, ‘advisory opinions’ by the EFTA Court and MERCOSUR 
courts) can legalize, ‘judicialize’ and legitimize international politics (e.g. among countries 
implementing OBOR projects) by compensating inadequate national judicial institutions by an 
‘integrated, multilevel judiciary’ engaging in ‘judicial dialogues’, common judicial justifications, 
‘checks and balances’, collective learning processes and ‘public reason-giving’. Republican and 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism can substitute for the lack of democratic constitutionalism inside China 
and some other OBOR participants, for instance by limiting political and judicial powers and protecting 
‘countervailing rights’ of citizens, companies and other non-governmental actors, litigants and third 
parties affected by dispute settlement proceedings.  
 
                                                     
197-200. On the interrelationships between Fuller’s eight principles of generality (law must take the form of general rules), 
publicity (law must be published), clarity (law must be comprehensible and not overly vague), consistency (laws must not 
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46  See note 12 and E.U.Petersmann, CETA, TTIP and TISA: New Trends in International Economic Law, in: S.Griller et alii 
(eds), Mega-Regional Agreements: TTIP, CETA, TISA. New Orientations for EU External Economic Relations, Oxford 
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